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Abstract We propose and explore financial instruments supporting programs for
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (FI-REDD). Within
a microeconomic framework we model interactions between an electricity producer
(EP), electricity consumer (EC), and forest owner (FO). To keep their profit at a max-
imum, the EP responds to increasing CO2 prices by adjusting electricity quantities
generated by different technologies and charging a higher electricity price to the EC.
The EP can prepare for future high (uncertain) CO2 prices by employing FI-REDD:
they can purchase an amount of offsets under an unknown future CO2 price and later,
when the CO2 price is discovered, decide howmany of these offsets to use for actually
offsetting emissions and sell the rest on the market, sharing the revenue with the FO.
FI-REDD allows for optional consumption of emission offsets by the EP (any amount
up to the initially contracted volume is allowed), and includes a benefit-sharingmecha-
nism between the EP and FO as it regards unused offsets. Themodeling results indicate
that FI-REDDmight help avoid bankruptcy of CO2-intensive producers at high levels
of CO2 prices and therefore serve as a stabilizing mechanism during the transition of
energy systems to greener technologies. The analytical results demonstrate the limits
for potential market size explained by existing uncertainties. We illustrated that when
suppliers and consumers of REDDoffsets have asymmetric information on future CO2
prices, benefit-sharing increases the contracted REDD offsets quantity.
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1 Introduction
This paper is devoted to the elaboration of financial instruments supporting the reduced
emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD+) mechanisms [24,30]. Over
500REDD+pilot projects were initiatedworldwide in the decade following theUnited
Nations framework convention on climate change (UNFCCC) negotiations [12]. The
total global pledge for REDD+ between 2006 and 2014 was estimated at USD 9.8
billion [11]. Only 10 % of this amount comes from voluntary carbon market with
the majority funded by multilateral and bilateral donors (public sector) including the
World Bank, the UN REDD initiative, and the Norwegian government [12,29]. The
EU and its Member States provided EUR 3 billion in support of REDD+ activities,
through a wide range of thematic areas, countries and funding channels [11]. Most
of this donor funding is intended for development of governing capacity, which is
necessary to properly manage REDD+ funding [12].
REDD is a relatively low-cost mitigation option [6,24], and its integration in the
global mitigation strategy has a potential to allow for larger emissions reductions and a
lower overall abatement cost [18]. This integration can be done by linking REDD as an
emission reduction credit program to major cap-and-trade programs [2]. For example,
[34]marks the growing linkages between theworld’s cap-and-trade systems forGHGs,
both directly between systems, and indirectly via connections to credit systems such
as the clean development mechanism. However, there is still an ongoing discussion
related to uncertainties and risks in REDD implementation. It is difficult to anticipate
the combined effects on carbon and other co-benefits owing to the disparity between
the activities available under the REDD program [7,22]. Accepting this uncertainty,
we explore the relation between REDD supplier and GHG-emitting energy producer
in the context of a potentially emerging REDD offsets market.
In the papers [13,39] the price-taking electricity producer’s decision-making con-
sists of choosing between investing in research and development (R&D) to implement
new technologies (carbon capture and storage (CCS) modules) and buying REDD
options. Our approach differs in several ways. Firstly, we consider the case when the
energy producer has market power (see, e.g. [16,17])—the ability to reduce the pro-
duction output and charge higher electricity prices to consumers. Thus, in the face of
uncertain CO2 prices, the electricity producer with market power has more flexibility
compared to the price-taking energy producer. We, therefore, consider a homoge-
nous product oligopoly model, in which each firm is maximizing its unilateral profits
against the residual demand curve constructed using the equilibrium actions chosen
by its competitors [42]. In this setting, the residual demand function faced by a sin-
gle firm gives the difference between the market demand and the amount that firm’s
competitors are willing to supply at each price. Secondly, the electricity producer in
our model is a medium-term decision maker: they do not change their technology
portfolio by decommissioning CO2-intensive plants and building new power plants
(which would be a long-term investment). The optimization model works with two
time steps: initial (low) CO2 price and future (uncertain) CO2 price. Generally, both
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investments in power generation capacity and forest management are long-term issues.
However, in our analysis we focus specifically on medium-term, where the transition
phase to higher CO2 prices and REDD offsets acceptance might happen. The problem
of REDD in the long-term forest management is very complex due to uncertainties
in estimating the baseline and sustainable forest management impacts. For example,
there are many methodological challenges related to forest definition, additionality,
leakage and permanence [35,40]. In our study we do not focus on these technical
aspects of REDD implementation. In our model REDD offsets are traded bilaterally
between the REDD supplier (forest owner) and consumer (electricity producer) in the
“first” period when the future CO2 prices are uncertain. We assume the acceptance of
REDD credits for emission offsetting in the future (“second” period when the CO2
price reveals), so that the contracted amount of REDD offsets (in tons of CO2) can
be used for emissions offsetting. We assume that in the “first” period the forest owner
can supply the amount of REDD offsets sufficient to cover potential emissions of
the electricity producer in the “second” period. In this setup the parties choose their
fair prices of REDD offsets in the “first” period—before the CO2 price reveals in the
“second” period.
This simplified rather conceptual modeling approach is justified because a dynamic
model would require additional information about the future which is not available at
the moment: CO2 price formation process, REDD offsets acceptance on the market,
etc. For this same reason we focus on the direct contracting of REDD offsets between
the forest owner and electricity producer, and do not consider market modeling. We
constructed a microeconomic model of interaction between the forest owner (REDD-
supplier), electricity producer, and electricity consumer. CO2 prices are exogenous in
the proposed partial equilibriummodeling framework. The decision-makingprocess of
the electricity producer (under condition of existing or absent CO2 tax/price) consists
of: (1) choosing power plant load factors tominimize the cost given the hourly electric-
ity demand profile and installed capacities of particular power generation technologies;
and (2) choosing an electricity price to maximize the profit based on the demand func-
tion indicating consumer sensitivity to electricity prices (see, e.g., [25,38]). Here we
apply a constant elasticity demand function [4] as a residual demand function in the
oligopoly model.
The elevating CO2 pricemight impact not only the profits of the electricity producer
(which decrease), but also the electricity prices for the consumer (which increase)
[20]. Hence, some financial instruments may be implemented today in order to be
prepared for uncertain CO2 prices in the future. We propose and explore financial
instruments supporting the REDD program. On the supply side of the REDD-based
emission offsets we model a forest owner who decides to preserve the forest and sell
respectively generated REDD-based emission offsets (further—REDD offsets). The
focus of our analysis is how the forest owner and the electricity producer evaluate
their fair prices for different amounts of REDD offsets. In the paper, the “fairness”
of the price is understood in the sense of each parties’ indifference to engaging in
contracting a given amount of REDD offsets. The fair price of the electricity producer
(forest owner) means that for higher (lower) prices the electricity producer (forest
owner) will not want to engage in the contract. Where both parties can agree on the
fair price, the problem is then to find themaximum amount of REDD offsets which can
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be contracted.A similar approach in a different problemsetup is considered in the paper
[37], where the authors developed a newsvendor model to determine the optimal price
and volume of CCS contracts to maximize the expected profit of a storage operator.
Forest carbon credits come with inherent risk—carbon storage activities may fail due
to leakage, forest fires, and increasing profitability of using the land for alternative
activities [35]. Here we do not discuss these risks in detail, assuming that they are
either reflected in the offsets price uncertainty or/and are insured.
The general idea of benefit-sharing is important within the REDD context [9,23].
Here we consider specifically a situation where benefits are shared between the REDD
supplier and consumer. Technically, a similarmechanism design, including the sharing
ratio, is implemented in various studies applied to problems other than REDD and
based on different modeling approaches, see e.g. parameter λ in [5] applied to the
problem of social control of government expenditures and parameter α in [28] applied
to the contracts in nuclear industry. The benefit-sharing scenarios in which certain
shares of the project’s revenues are earmarked for the local government and injected
back into the regional economy are considered in [10]. The benefit-sharing concept is
also relevant in the international law context [27].
We propose a benefit-sharing mechanism that is activated when the electricity pro-
ducer emits less than the amount ofREDDoffsets contracted in the first period (without
CO2 price); in this case the unused amount of REDD offsets is shared with the forest
owner in the second period. We show that for this benefit-sharing mechanism there is
an equilibrium amount of REDD offsets up to which the fair prices coincide, mean-
ing that the deal takes place. We prove that for larger amounts of REDD offsets the
desired price of the electricity producer (buyer) is lower than the price of the forest
owner (seller), meaning that for these larger amounts the deal is not possible. The
paper considers mathematical constructions and properties of the proposed financial
instrument. Analytical results presented in the paper are illustrated by a numerical case
study based on realistic data for regional electricity production. The modeling results
indicate that financial instruments supporting REDD might help avoid bankruptcy of
CO2-intensive producers at high CO2 price levels and, therefore, serve as a stabilizing
mechanism during the transition of energy systems to greener technologies.
2 Modeling framework
In this section, firstly, we present a model of an electricity producer with market power
operating without contracting REDD offsets. The decision-making of the electricity
producer consists in choosing a technological mix in order to meet the hourly demand
and to maximize profit. In this framework the optimal response in terms of the emis-
sions reduction and raising electricity price can be constructed for any CO2 price.
Secondly, we introduce a two-period model for REDD offsets contracting. In the first
period (“today”) there is no CO2 price and the electricity producer sells the opti-
mal amount of electricity (maximizing their profit). This quantity is generated by an
optimal technological mix. A corresponding CO2 quantity is emitted, and an equilib-
rium electricity price is charged to consumers. In the second period (“tomorrow”), the
uncertain CO2 price appears. Given the electricity producer’s technological capacity
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and market power, they can solve an optimization problem for potential CO2 prices.
In [20] we show that in response to growing CO2 price, the profit decreases and elec-
tricity price increases. Therefore uncertain CO2 prices bear risk of profit loss for the
electricity producer. Profit losses are higher for higher CO2 prices. This leads to a con-
sideration of the possibility to contract REDDoffsets today in order to offset emissions
tomorrow. Assuming a fixed amount of contracted REDD offsets in the first period,
and given distribution of uncertain CO2 price in the second period, the electricity
producer solves the optimization problem (choosing technological mix for each CO2
price realization in the second period) with two options: either (1) to emit more than
the available REDD offsets, or (2) to emit less and, hence, sell the excess of offsets on
the market, sharing the benefit with the forest owner. The second option is considered
under a benefit-sharing ratio given in the first period. Based on the comparison of the
second-period expected profits with and without contracting REDD offsets, the elec-
tricity producer evaluates their fair (indifference) price for each amount of offsets in the
first period. Thus, our study deals with the utility indifference pricing similar to [14].
The forest owner—the seller of REDD offsets—calculates their fair price in the first
period by comparing their expected profits with and without selling REDD offsets to
the electricity producer in the first period. In the latter case the forest owner sells
the offsets only in the second period at the realized market price. The forest owner
knows the electricity producer’s best response in the second period in terms of their
utilization of REDD offsets for actual offsetting versus the option of partly reselling
them on the market. This best response is expressed in the offsets amounts shared
in the second period under a given amount of REDD offsets contracted in the first
period and benefit-sharing ratio fixed in the first period. The focus of the study is on
construction of the fair prices for a range of REDD-based offsets in order to find the
quantities which can be contracted (i.e. those quantities for which the seller’s price
does not exceed the buyer’s price). We also look at how the benefit-sharing ratio can
impact contracted amounts.
2.1 Notations
In ourmodel the electricity producer uses n technologies that vary in costs (US$/MWh,
excluding emission costs) and emission factors (ton of CO2/MWh). Let us introduce
the following notations:
ai , i = 1, . . . , n are installed capacities (MW);
vi are variable costs (US$/MWh);
d j , j = 1, . . . , 24 is hourly average demand (MW);
x = {xi j }, i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , 24, is amatrix of hourly load factors (controls,
ratio between 0 and 1);
q(x) = (q1, . . . , q24) = {∑ni=1 ai xi j } is a vector of hourly outputs (MWh);
Q = Q(x) = ∑ni=1 ai
∑24
j=1 xi j is aggregate daily production (MWh);
Pe is electricity price (US$/MWh);
D−1 : Pe = D−1(Q) is inverse demand function (see Sect. 4.1);
εi are emission factors (ton of CO2/MWh);
p is CO2 price (US$/ton of CO2).
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For each matrix of load factors x the profit of the electricity producer in the absence
of CO2 price is calculated as follows:
e(x) = R(x) − C(x), (1)
where
R(x) = Pe(Q(x))Q(x), (2)
is the revenue, and
C(x) =
n∑
i=1
vi ai
24∑
j=1
xi j + Fc, (3)
is the cost function. A constant fixed cost component, Fc, is not included in the opti-
mization problem, and is used only for profit calculation.
For each CO2 price p a production scenario x generates corresponding emissions:
E(x) =
n∑
i=1
εi ai
24∑
j=1
xi j , (4)
and the total profit of the electricity producer is calculated as follows:
(x, p) = e(x) − E(x)p. (5)
We will assume that the CO2 price belongs to a segment p ∈ [0, p˜]. Let us note
that the profit component e and emissions E do not directly depend on price p, how-
ever, they are indirectly determined by the technological possibilities of the electricity
producer.
We assume that the hourly profile changes proportionally to the aggregate demand
(see [20] and Sect. 4.1 for details) and introduce the feasibility domain X , which
contains all technological mixes (controls) satisfying the hourly demand:
X =
{
x : xi j ∈ [0, 1] and q(x) ≥ Q(x)
Q0
d0
}
, (6)
where d0 = (d01 , . . . , d024) and Q0 are, respectively, the initial hourly and daily aggre-
gate demands (at zero CO2 price).
In our modeling framework we consider the electricity producer as a profit-
maximizing decision maker. The profit maximization problem is formulated as
follows.
Problem 1 (without REDD offsets) Given the feasibility domain X (6), the electricity
producer chooses technological mix x maximizing their profit (5) at a CO2 price p:
maximize
x∈X (x, p). (7)
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Let us denote a solution to Problem 1—the optimal technological mix—by the
symbol x∗1 = x∗1 (p) for any price p ∈ [0, p˜]. Then, by definition of x∗1 for any x ∈ X
(6) the following inequality holds:
(x∗1 , p) ≥ (x, p). (8)
Let us denote by the symbol ˆ(p) the maximum profit at price p:
ˆ(p) = (x∗1 (p), p) = e(x∗1 (p)) − E(x∗1 (p))p. (9)
The corresponding electricity price is calculated as Pe(Q(x∗1 (p)).
2.2 First period: no carbon price
We assume, that in the first period (“today”) there is no CO2 price. Hence, Problem 1 is
solved for p = 0.The electricity producer chooses anoptimal technologicalmix x∗1 (0),
and gets the corresponding profit ˆ(0), by charging electricity price Pe = D(Q0) (see
(6)). Simultaneously, they emit the amount E0 = E(x∗1 (0)) of CO2. The electricity
producer envisions uncertain CO2 prices in the second period (“tomorrow”).
2.3 Second period without REDD offsets: assumptions for modeling
In the second period the electricity producer can solve Problem 1 for any potential
CO2 price. In our study we assume the following properties of optimal profit ˆ(p)
(9) and emissions Eˆ(p) = E(x∗1 (p)) with respect to CO2 price.
Assumption 1 The optimal profit and optimal emissions achieve their maxima at
zero CO2 price, p = 0, and are continuous strictly declining functions with respect to
growing p:
ˆ(p) ↓, Eˆ(p) ↓, when p ↑ . (10)
This assumption is straightforward in the provided modeling framework [20]. It is
also consistent with results of larger scale modeling [31].
Remark 1 Under assumption 1 for every CO2 price p ∈ [0, p˜] there exists a unique
emissions level Eˆ(p) = E(x∗1 (p)) corresponding to maximum profit ˆ(p).
Remark 2 Assumption 1 basically restricts the consideration of electricity producers
to those unfavorably (negatively) affected by an emerging CO2 price. Those who can
potentially benefit from it, e.g. due to a competitive advantage, are not considered
here. This situation is beyond the scope of this paper, which is focused on the problem
of CO2-intensive power generation.
Based on Assumption 1 we prove the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 For any x ∈ X (6), such that E(x) = E(x∗1 (p)), the following inequality
holds for all p ∈ (0, p˜]:
e(x∗1 (p)) − E(x∗1 (p))p > e(x) − E(x)p. (11)
The proof is given in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 1 has the following meaning. If we fix CO2 price p and select an arbitrary
mix of technologies x satisfying the hourly demand, such that the corresponding
emissions differ from optimal emissions for the price p, then this mix x is not optimal
for the electricity producer in the sense of profit maximization.
2.3.1 Modeling CO2 price uncertainty
Let the future CO2 price be an uncertain variable [33] following a discrete probability
distribution:
{pl , wl}, l = 1, . . . ,m,
m∑
l=1
wl = 1, pl ∈ [0, p˜], wl ∈ (0, 1], (12)
where wl stands for probability, and realizations of possible prices pi = p j , if i = j .
In our model we assume that the electricity producer and forest owner are both
risk neutral and, therefore, we deal with expected values. Given the distribution (12),
the electricity producer calculates their expected utility in the second period (without
REDD):
E[ˆ] =
m∑
l=1
ˆ(pl)wl . (13)
High CO2 price decreases the profit of the electricity producer. The emitter can
prepare for possibly high future CO2 price by contracting REDD offsets before the
information about CO2 price is revealed; contracted REDD offsets would allow off-
setting CO2 emissions in the future with forest owners supplying REDD offsets. Let
us note that we are not taking into account additional factors in the payoff of the forest
owner, e.g. the opportunity of deforesting and selling the wood. We assume that the
forest owner decided to keep the forest for generating REDD offsets.
A problem is divided into two stages: at the first stage forest owner and electricity
producer assign their prices for an amount E ∈ (0, E0] of REDD offsets. Here E0
is the maximum amount of emissions—generated by the electricity producer at zero
CO2 price, i.e. E0 = Eˆ(0). If the forest owner does not make contracts with the
electricity producer in the first period, for any amount E their expected utility in the
second period is calculated as follows:
E[0F ] =
m∑
l=1
E plwl = E
m∑
l=1
plwl = p¯E, (14)
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where 0F = 0F (pl) is their profit in the second without contracting the electricity
producer in the first period, and p¯ is the mean of distribution (12). Expression (14)
means keeping all the offsets in the first period, and selling them in the second period
at a market price.
2.4 Second period with REDD offsets
At the second stage they face a realization of uncertain CO2 price. At each realization
of the CO2 price the electricity producer can either use all REDD offsets (by emitting
more or equal to the previously contracted amount E), or emit less than E and share
the benefit with the forest owner from selling the rest (unused offsets) in the market
(at a market price p).
Benefit-sharing mechanism The electricity producer and forest owner, when selling
offsets on the market, get shares of the market price δ and (1− δ) respectively, so that:
– If δ = 1, the electricity producer has the right to sell the offsets in the second
period at a market price without sharing the profit with forest owner.
– If δ = 0, the electricity producer can only use the contracted REDD credits to
offset the factual amount of their emissions and the unused credits are returned
(without compensation) back to the forest owner, i.e. no resale by the electricity
producer is possible on the market. The profit from unused offsets goes entirely to
the forest owner.
– If 0 < δ < 1, the electricity producer faces a trade-off between emitting more and,
hence, using more of the contracted REDD credits for offsetting their emissions
versus sharing the profit with the forest owner from selling the offsets at the market
price.
The benefit-sharing ratio δ is included in the evaluation process of offsets amount
E by the REDD offsets supplier (forest owner) and consumer (electricity producer)
in the first period. Namely, for a given δ and E in the first period, the forest owner
and electricity producer choose their fair prices, based on the electricity producer’s
decision-making in the second period with REDD. This is illustrated in Fig. 1.
We assume that the forest owner and electricity producer face the same CO2 price
distribution. The presence of REDD offsets at the second stage of the model leads to
the following modification in the decision-making problem of the electricity producer
compared to the case without REDD (see Problem 1).
Problem 2 (with REDD offsets) Given the feasibility domain X (6), CO2 price dis-
tribution {pl , wl} (12), benefit-sharing ratio δ ∈ [0, 1] and amount of REDD offsets
E ∈ (0, E0] contracted in the first time period the electricity producer chooses tech-
nological mix x maximizing their profit at a CO2 price realization pl in the second
time period:
maximize
x∈X 
R(x, pl), (15)
where
R(x, pl) = e(x) − pl
[
E(x) − E]+ + δpl
[E − E(x)]+. (16)
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Fig. 1 Illustration of the problem setting: potentially contracted amount of offsets E and realization of the
uncertain CO2 price. Given E and benefit-sharing ratio δ the electricity producer optimizes their techno-
logical mix in order to maximize their profits in the second period. This optimization determines whether
they share REDD offsets with the forest owner, and, if yes, the amount of shared offsets. This best response
in the second period is used by parties to evaluate the fair prices (23), (24) for the amount E (under a given
δ) in the first period
Here [y]+ = max{y, 0}, meaning that the electricity producer can offset their
emissions up to the amount E by using REDD offsets, the rest is sold on the market
and the profit is shared with the forest owner.
The optimal technological mix x∗2 (pl)—solution to (15)—generates the maximum
profit with REDD: ˆR(pl) = R(x∗2 (pl), pl) at a particular CO2 price pl . We denote
by the symbol ER(pl) =
[E − E(x∗2 (pl))
]
+ the corresponding amount of emission
offsets, shared with the forest owner in the second period. The corresponding expected
values are calculated as follows:
E[ˆR(E, δ)] =
m∑
l=1
ˆR(pl)wl , p¯ =
m∑
l=1
plwl . (17)
Here ER(pl) is the best response of the electricity producer in the second period,
which is known to the forest owner in the first period. This allows to calculate their
expected profit, when contracting REDD:
E[RF (E, δ)] =
m∑
l=1
(1 − δ)pl E R(pl)wl . (18)
Here RF denotes the forest owner’s profit, when dealing with the electricity producer
in the first period. Note that profit of the electricity producer, ˆR , with REDD in the
second period does not include the cost of offsets paid to the forest owner in the first
period. The profit of the forest owner, RF , with REDD in the second period also does
not include the benefit from selling offsets to the electricity producer in the first period.
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Wewill introduce these costs (benefits) below, when defining the fair prices for REDD
offsets.
2.5 Fair prices of REDD offsets
The discussion below is devoted to the valuation of various amounts of REDD offsets
contracted in the first time period under unknown CO2 price assuming the given
distribution (12) and benefit-sharing ratio δ ∈ [0, 1]. The forest owner and electricity
producer evaluate their fair (indifference) prices for the given amount of options. Thus,
the forest owner chooses their fair price pF at which they can sell the amount of offsets
E in the first period using the utility indifference condition:
E[ˆRF + pFE] = E[0F ], (19)
meaning that the forest owner can either sell the emission offsets to the electricity
producer in the first period and, possibly, get a profit share in the second period, or
keep the offsets and sell them in the second period at the market CO2 price without
engaging in a deal with the electricity producer. Substituting (18) and (14) to (19), we
obtain the following equation with respect to pF :
(1 − δ) ×
m∑
l=1
pl E
R(pl)wl + pFE = p¯E, (20)
Similarly, the electricity producer derives the price they are willing to pay for the
REDD offsets according to their indifference condition:
E[ˆR − pEE] = E[ˆ]. (21)
Susbstituting (17) and (13) to (21), we obtain the following equation with respect to
pE :
E[ˆR(E, δ)] − pEE = E[ˆ]. (22)
For the given CO2 price distribution {pl , wl}, l = 1, . . . ,m (12), benefit-sharing
ratio δ ∈ [0, 1] and amount of offsets E ∈ (0, E0] based on Eqs. (20), (22) we derive
the fair prices of the forest owner pF and the electricity producer pE :
pF = pF (E, δ) = p¯ − (1 − δ)
∑m
l=1 pl E R(pl)wl
E , (23)
pE = pE (E, δ) =
E
[
ˆR(E, δ)
]
− E
[
ˆ
]
E . (24)
For a fixed parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] Eqs. (23), (24) represent supply and demand
curves for REDDoffsets within the suggested benefit-sharing approach. The following
analysis is based on the decision-making of the electricity producer with REDDoffsets
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in the second period. We find their fair price pE (24) in the first period for a given δ
and E . The forest owner knows the best response of the electricity producer in terms
of ER(pl). Based on this information, they calculate their fair price, pF , in the first
period according to Eq. (23).
2.6 Decision-making with REDD offsets, benefit-sharing mechanism, and
known realization of CO2 price in the second time period
In order to analyze the behavior of the electricity producer let us consider a certain
realization of CO2 price p = pl in the second period. Technically, Problem 2 can
be split into two alternative profit-maximizing tasks. In short, they represent two
alternatives: to share, or not to share.
Problem 3 (E(x) ≥ E) Given the feasibility domain X (6) and the amount of REDD
offsets E ∈ (0, E0], find technological mix x maximizing the profit at a CO2 price
realization p:
maximize
x∈X3
R3 (p, x), (25)
where
R3 (p, x) = e(x) − p(E(x) − E), (26)
X3 = X ∩ {x : E(x) ≥ E}. (27)
Let us denote the solution to Problem 3 by the symbol x∗3 = x∗3 (p) ∈ X3. The
corresponding maximum profit is given by the relation:
ˆR3 = ˆR3 (p) = e(x∗3 ) − p(E(x∗3 ) − E). (28)
Problem 4 (E(x) ≤ E) Given the feasibility domain X (6), benefit-sharing ratio
δ ∈ [0, 1] and the amount of REDD offsets E ∈ (0, E0], find technological mix x
maximizing the profit at a CO2 price realization p:
maximize
x∈X4
R4 (p, x), (29)
where
R4 (p, x) = e(x) − δp(E(x) − E), (30)
X4 = X ∩ {x : E(x) ≤ E}. (31)
Let us denote the solution to Problem 4 by the symbol x∗4 = x∗4 (p) ∈ X4. The
corresponding maximum profit is given by the relation:
ˆR4 = ˆR4 (p) = e(x∗4 ) − δp(E(x∗4 ) − E). (32)
Thus, for any fixed amount E ∈ (0, E0] available in the second period, the
electricity producer chooses the best response to CO2 price p = pl in terms of profit-
maximization—between ˆR3 (28) and ˆ
R
4 (32):
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ˆR(p) = max{ˆR3 , ˆR4 }, (33)
which is equivalent to (15), (16). The solution to Problem 2 is chosen according to the
rule:
x∗2 =
{
x∗3 , if ˆ
R = ˆR3
x∗4 , if ˆ
R = ˆR4
(34)
The described optimization alternatives as possibilities for the electricity producer
in our two-stage model are illustrated in Fig. 1.
3 Analytical results
In this section we analytically find the maximum profit (33) of the electricity producer
depending on the amount of REDD offsets E ∈ (0, E0] and determine the correspond-
ing fair prices of the forest owner and electricity producer. This allows us to obtain an
estimate of the amount of REDD offsets that can be contracted.
We introduce the following function of CO2 price p:
ξ(p) = ˆ
R(p) − ˆ(p)
E . (35)
Using this function the fair price of the electricity producer (24) can be represented as
follows:
pE = pE (E, δ) =
M∑
l=1
ξ(pl)wl . (36)
Similarly, we introduce the function:
φ(p) = p − (1 − δ) E
R(p)p
E , (37)
and represent the forest owner’s fair price (23) in the following way:
pF = pF (E, δ) =
M∑
l=1
φ(pl)wl . (38)
Lemma 2 For any CO2 price realization p ∈ [0, p˜] in the second period, any benefit-
sharing ratio δ ∈ [0, 1], and any fixed amount E of offsets contracted in the first period
such that E ∈ (0, E(x∗1 (p))], the maximum profit with REDD (33) in the second period
is calculated as follows:
ˆR(p) = ˆR3 = e(x∗1 (p)) − pE(x∗1 (p)) + pE . (39)
The proof is in Appendix A.2
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Remark 3 The definition of Lemma 2 is that for any realization of future CO2 price p
in the second period the optimal technological mix, solving Problem 2 with REDD,
is the same as in Problem 1 without REDD, i.e. x∗2 (p) = x∗1 (p), provided that the
offsets amount (contracted in the first period) does not exceed the optimal quantity of
emissions (without REDD) for that CO2 price p (in the second period), E ≤ E(x∗1 (p)).
Corollary 1 If conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied at a CO2 price realization p = pl
in the distribution (12), then E R(p) = 0 and according to ˆ(p) (9), ˆR(p) (39),
φ(p) (37), ξ(p) (35), the equality takes place:
φ(p) = ξ(p) = p. (40)
Lemma 3 For any CO2 price realization p ∈ [0, p˜] in the second period, any benefit-
sharing δ ∈ [0, 1), and any amount E of offsets contracted in the first period such that
E > E(x∗1 (p)), the following inequality takes place:
φ(p) > ξ(p). (41)
The proof is in Appendix A.3.
Finally, let us formulate and prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For a given CO2 price distribution {pl , wl}, l = 1, . . . ,m (12) and for
any benefit-sharing ratio δ ∈ [0, 1) there exists an amount E˜ ∈ (0, E0] of REDD
offsets up to which the fair prices of the forest owner pF (23) and of the electricity
producer pE (24) coincide and are equal to the expected CO2 price p¯. This amount
equals theminimumoptimal quantity of emissions generatedby the electricity producer
(in the second period without REDD offsets) at the maximum possible CO2 price
p˜ = max{pl}:
pF = pE = p¯ for any E ≤ E˜, δ ∈ [0, 1], (42)
where
E˜ = E(x∗1 ( p˜)). (43)
For any amount of REDD offsets larger than E˜ (43) the fair price of the forest owner
pF is higher than the fair price of the electricity producer pE:
pF > pE for any E > E˜, δ ∈ [0, 1). (44)
The proof is in Appendix A.4:
Remark 4 Theorem 1 shows that in the case of a bounded CO2 price distribution,
the forest owner and electricity producer can contract any amount E ∈ (0, E˜] of
REDD offsets for the fair price p¯. Thus, in the considered risk-neutral case, only two
characteristics of distribution fully determine the solution to the problem: the mean
and the highest price.
The practical consequence following from this main result is that—on one hand—
the contracted amount is limited by the potentially high futureCO2 price (the higher the
price, the lower is the contracted amount). On the other hand, even with a potentially
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Table 1 Technological data for the case-study
Technology Annual fixed
cost,
thousands
of US$/MWy
Variable
cost, US$/MWh
Installed
capacity, MW
Emission factors,
tons of CO2/MWh
Coal-fired 224 18.9 3800 1.02
Natural gas-fired
combustion turbine
64 55.6 1900 0.55
Natural gas-fired
combined cycle
96 39 2200 0.33
Sources: [25,36,41]
high CO2 price, the contracted amount is non-zero, hinting at possible implemen-
tation of the REDD-based offset instrument featuring a benefit-sharing approach as
considered in this paper.
4 Modeling results
Analytical results obtained in the previous section are valid for a broad rangeof possible
model setups in our modeling framework. In order to provide a numerical example and
illustrate the impact of a contracted amount of REDD offsets on the profit distribution
of the electricity producer, we calibrate the model for a realistic case-study, and carry
out numeric optimization.
4.1 Data and calibration
Technologies in themodel In our illustrative case study a regional electricity producer is
operating power plants with the following technologies: coal (pulverized coal steam),
combustion turbine (natural gas-fired) and combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) (see
[25]). The corresponding fixed and variable costs, as well as the installed capacities are
given in Table 1. The total size of installed capacity (7900 MW) is chosen to illustrate
a model at a regional scale, and is roughly equivalent to the installed capacity of
Belarus.1
Average hourly electricity demand To construct an economically efficient produc-
tion plan the electricity producer has to determine the combination of technologies to
be used hourly during the day in order to satisfy the hourly demand profile. A hypo-
thetical demand profile for an average day of the year is depicted in Fig. 2. It features
the same shape (peaks) as the regional profiles provided in the literature [1,3]. The
hourly demand values are scaled to match the installed capacity of the electricity pro-
ducer (as in Table 1). Similar to [1] we use the hourly average demand for each day
over a longer period, e.g. one year. This simplification allows us to link the hourly
1 See International Energy Statistics provided by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) http://
www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=2&pid=2&aid=7.
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Fig. 2 Average hourly electricity demand
profile with the aggregate demand. We estimate the hourly profile change assuming
that a change in aggregate demand leads to the proportional shifts in every hour of the
profile for an average day. Our model is working with an average demand profile at
the annual scale and provides a higher level of abstraction than the unit commitment
(UC) problem (see e.g. [32]).
Demand function We assume that the electricity producer has market power in
the region, and use a constant elasticity demand curve, that is commonly employed
in aggregate energy demand studies [4,21]. The consumers respond to the change in
electricity price Pe by changing the consumption Q according to an aggregate demand
function D(Pe), i.e.:
Pe = D−1(Q) = AQα, (45)
where A > 0 is a constant, and α < 0 is the constant elasticity of demand. The
coefficients of the aggregate demand function in our model are calibrated in such a
way that a realistic electricity price (close to European2 electricity price) is achieved
as a solution to Problem 1. The estimated parameters of the demand function (45) are
A = 1.05×105,α = −0.612. These values are consistent with Pe = 90.5US$/MWh
at profit’s maximum without CO2 price. The value of elasticity coefficient 	d = 1α =−1.63 is within a plausible range as estimated in the literature (for a set of OECD
countries it was found to be within the confidence interval of−2.3, . . . ,−0.1, see, e.g.
2 See Quarterly Reports On European Electricity Markets http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/statistics/
market-analysis.
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Fig. 3 Fair prices of the electricity producer (EP) and forest owner (FO) depending on the volume of REDD
offsets. Benefit-sharing ratio is δ = 0.5, and future CO2 price distribution is uniform within the range 0–80
US$/ton CO2
[21]). In our example the profit maximizing quantity is Q0 = 100.47GWh (which
is approximately equal to the average daily electricity consumption in Belarus3), and
the corresponding profit is ˆ(Q0) = 3.56mln. US$.
Emissions factors For presently operating, coal-fired power plants the cummulative
emissions range between 950 and 1250 gCO2 eq/kWh [41]. In our studywe use a value
from an indicated interval given in Table 1. Emissions factors for gas powered plants
are taken from [36].
4.2 Numerical results
Simulations were carried out for the discrete (nine points) approximation of a uniform
price distribution within the range 0–80 US$/ton of CO2:
pl = 10(l − 1), wl = 1
9
, l = 1, . . . , 9. (46)
Sizes ofREDD-based offset contracts used in themodel arewithin the range [0, E0],
where E0 is the optimal emissionswithout CO2 price. In Fig. 3 the fair prices (23), (24)
with respect to the contracted amount of offsets E ≤ E0 are depicted for the benefit-
sharing ratio δ = 0.5. The plot demonstrates that the maximum amount of emissions
offsets for which the deal can take place is E˜ = E(x∗(p9)) = 10.93 MtCO2. That
amount the electricity producer emits at the maximum CO2 price p9 = 80 US$/ton
3 See the EIA website http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=2&pid=2&aid=2.
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Fig. 4 Profit of the electricity producer (distribution) without contracting REDD offsets and with contract-
ing REDD offsets for the optimal volume (E˜ = 10.93 MtCO2) and benefit-sharing ratio δ = 0.5
CO2, while maximizing their profit. For amounts larger than E˜ the fair price of the
forest owner is higher than the fair price of the electricity producer. This is consistent
with analytical results of the paper.
In Fig. 4 we show how the contracted amount E˜ impacts the profit distribution
of the electricity producer. The plot shows that the mean profit determined by the
considered CO2 price distribution stays the same with REDD offsets (compared to
the case without them), according to indifference condition (22). However, entering
into a REDD offsets contract does impact the profit distribution. Firstly, according
to Theorem 1, the fair price of the amount E˜ is pE = p¯. Secondly, at each price
realization, Lemma 2 is valid, meaning that, profits with REDD and without REDD
are calculated according to Eq. (39). Including the cost of offsets, pE E˜ , in the first
period, we get the net profit with REDD at each price realization in the second period:
ˆR(p) = ˆ(p) + (p − pE )E˜ = ˆ(p) + (p − p¯)E˜ . (47)
This analytical expression is reflected in Fig. 4. The profits coincide at the mean
price, which is p¯ = 40 US$/ton CO2; the profit with REDD is lower than the profit
without REDD for price realizations p < p¯, and higher—for price realizations p > p¯.
Notably, REDD offsets help the electricity producer to be better off for higher CO2
prices and almost double their profit in this case.
4.3 The role of the benefit-sharing mechanism
In this section we provide a numerical illustration of how the benefit-sharing mech-
anism determined by the parameter δ can impact the amount of contracted REDD
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Fig. 5 Impacts of benefit-sharing on the contracted amounts of REDD-based offsets under asymmetric
information on theCO2 price distribution.Dashed lines are fair prices of the forest owner (FO) and electricity
producer (EP) for benefit-sharing ratio δ = 0.5, solid lines—for δ = 0 (no benefit-sharing)
offsets. Even though the benefit-sharing concept is at the core of the suggested con-
struction, it remains inactive if electricity producer and forest owner use one common
CO2 price distribution in their decision-making. Let us explore a situation when the
electricity producer and forest owner perceive the CO2 price distribution asymmet-
rically. For instance, they could put different weights wl in (12) for the same values
of CO2 prices pl . For example, the forest owner may expect the distribution as in
(46), while the electricity producer may put more weight on higher prices, i.e. their
distribution can be:
pl = 10(l − 1), wl = 0.01(l + 6.11), l = 1, . . . , 9. (48)
The difference between (46) and (48) can be interpreted as the electricity producer
is more sensitive to larger profit losses (risk-averse). In the case of price distribution
(48) (risk-averseness), the contracted amount E˜ of the electricity producer is higher as
they are willing to pay a higher fair price compared to the case with the distribution
(46). Figure 5 demonstrates how the benefit-sharing ratio δ impacts the amount of
contracted offsets E˜ : for larger parameter δ, the contracted amount E˜(δ) is larger.
In this example for δ = 0.5 the contracted amount of REDD offsets has increased
considerably compared to no benefit-sharing, δ = 0. This preliminary analysis shows
that the benefit-sharing mechanism has a potential to increase the volume of REDD
contracts. Note that in Fig. 5 the total sum of the deal is growing despite the lower
price, i.e. about 30 % increase in REDD financing can be achieved.
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5 Discussion and conclusions
Aconsiderable total share of emissions is derived from the energy sector (see, e.g., [8]).
Therefore in developing a fair mechanism for REDD it is important to understand the
decision-making process (optimal behavior) of energy producers. Our model deals
with medium-term planning of the electricity producer who possesses flexibility in
their responses to uncertain CO2 prices. The electricity producer in the model is
restricted in exercising market power (charging the electricity price) by the elasticity
of residual demand and maximizes their profit by optimizing technological mixes in
the production. The analytical results provided in the paper are based only on the
assumption that with growing CO2 price, optimal profit and corresponding emissions
are strictly declining functions. The problem of optimal usage of REDD offsets by
the electricity producer is formalized in the two-period model with an uncertain CO2
price.
The valuation of REDD offsets by the forest owner (seller) and electricity producer
(buyer) based on their fair (indifference) conditions has several important implications.
We show that when there is no profit sharing mechanism and the forest owner can use
and resell all the offsets traded at the first stage, then the agreement can bemade for any
amount of REDD offsets at the mean CO2 price. This, however, would imply a high
level of certainty about the future CO2 price, so that the risk for the buyer (possible
lower price) and risk for the seller (possible higher price) are acceptable in the sense
that the risk-neutral approach is applicable. In the case of benefit-sharing coming
from selling the unused offsets on the market and sharing the profit between the forest
owner and electricity producer, we analytically prove two results. Firstly, there exist
amounts of REDD offsets for which the fair prices coincide and are equal to the mean
CO2 price. The maximum contracted amount corresponds to the minimum amount
of emissions generated by the electricity producer—at the maximum expected CO2
price. Secondly, for larger amounts the fair price of the electricity producer is lower
than the fair price of the forest owner and, therefore, these amounts are not contracted.
This fact is not straightforward in the scenario when the electricity producer can share
the profit with the forest owner, and the analytical proof is given in Lemma 3 (see
Case 2 in Appendix A.3). This means that someone will lose if the forest owner agrees
to sell a “larger” amount of REDD offsets at the price suggested by the electricity
producer compared to a situation when not making this deal. In our problem setting
two characteristics of the expected CO2 price distribution are important for contracting
REDD offsets—the mean CO2 price, and the maximum expected CO2 price.
We illustrated the impact of contracted REDD offsets on profit distribution of the
electricity producer in the numerical example based on realistic data. The modeling
results indicate that contracted REDD offsets might help avoid bankruptcy of CO2-
intensive producers at high levels of CO2 price and therefore serve as a stabilizing
mechanism during the transition of energy systems to greener technologies.
The idea behind the benefit-sharing mechanism that we suggested to use, is to
reduce the offsets price in the first period providing more favorable conditions for the
electricity producer and keeping the flexibility for additional income for the forest
owner (as additional benefits might come later in the second period). As we basically
explore a contract between two parties, from the legal perspective, we could imagine a
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trustee keeping the offsets andmaking sure the benefits are shared. There are also other
challenges related to institutional options, e.g. monitoring, reporting and verification
for REDD+ programs [15]. However these aspects are clearly beyond the scope of our
study.
The current partial equilibriummodel connecting CO2-intensive energy sector with
REDD creates the necessary prerequisites for modeling REDD in a wider context. A
possiblemodel expansion couldbe connectedwithmerging the current frameworkwith
the detailed analysis of the supply side for REDD, i.e. a sustainable forest manage-
ment model, where risks associated with ecological hazards, e.g. forest fires [19,26],
could be adequately implemented. Finally, institutional grounds could be defined in
connection with these research studies.
In the presented modeling exercise, we would like to highlight a situation of asym-
metric CO2 price distributions. It provides a preliminary illustration of the positive
role of a benefit-sharing mechanism by increasing contracted amounts of REDD off-
sets, as well as the volume of a deal. This mechanism has a potential for initiating
the direct contracting of REDD offsets, as it provides more flexibility to both parties:
energy sector and forestry (lowering initial price for the former and keeping the option
for additional benefits for the latter). Let us note, that there is an actual possibility for
small-scale implementation of such mechanism, e.g. through the currently active Ver-
ified Carbon Standard (VCS) system,4 which is a known developer of standards for
REDD projects.
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A Proof of analytical results
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof Firstly, by definition of maximum (8) we have:
(x∗1 (p), p) = e(x∗1 (p)) − E(x∗1 (p))p ≥ e(x) − E(x)p. (49)
Secondly, let us assume on the contrary that for some x¯ ∈ X , such that E(x¯) =
E(x∗1 (p)), relation (49) is equality. Then we have:
ˆ(p) = e(x∗1 (p)) − E(x∗1 (p))p = e(x¯) − E(x¯)p. (50)
According to Remark 1 to Assumption 1 Eq. (50) means that:
Eˆ(p) = E(x∗1 (p)) = E(x¯). (51)
Thus, we came to a contradiction, meaning that assumption (50) is false, and (11)
is true. 	unionsq
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof Firstly, by the condition of the lemma E(x∗1 (p)) ≥ E , meaning that x∗1 (p) ∈ X3
(27). Secondly, (25) is equivalent to (7) and, hence, solution to Problem 3 coincides
with the solution to Problem 1: x∗3 = x∗1 (p). To complete the proof we need to show
that: ˆR3 ≥ ˆR4 in (33).
Indeed, using (28), (32) and definition ofmaximum at price p (8), for x∗4 ∈ X4 ⊂ X
we come to the following chain of inequalities:
ˆR3 (p) = e(x∗3 ) − p(E(x∗3 ) − E) = e(x∗1 (p)) − pE(x∗1 (p)) + pE
≥ e(x∗4 ) − pE(x∗4 ) + pE = e(x∗4 ) − p(E(x∗4 ) − E)
≥ e(x∗4 ) − δp(E(x∗4 ) − E) = ˆR4 (p). (52)
This relationmeans that ˆR3 (p) ≥ ˆR4 (p) if δ = 1, and ˆR3 (p) > ˆR4 (p) if δ ∈ [0, 1).
Thus,
ˆR(p) = ˆR3 (p) = ˆ(p) + pE . (53)
	unionsq
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof Let us consider two cases depending on the optimal profit in (33).
Case 1 ˆR(p) = ˆR3 , meaning that the electricity producer does not share emission
offsets with the forest owner and emits E(x∗3 ) ≥ E . In this case ER(p) = 0, meaning
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that:
φ(p) = p. (54)
Substitution of (9) and (28) to (35) leads to:
ξ(p) = p + e(x
∗
3 ) − E(x∗3 )p
E −
e(x∗1 (p)) − E(x∗1 (p))p
E (55)
For x∗3 ∈ X such that E(x∗3 ) = E > E(x∗1 (p)) we can apply Lemma 1. Hence,
(55) leads to the required inequality:
e(x∗3 ) − E(x∗3 )p
E −
e(x∗1 (p)) − E(x∗1 (p))p
E < 0 ⇒ ξ(p) < p = φ(p), (56)
which proves Case 1.
Case 2 ˆR(p) = ˆR4 , meaning that the electricity producer can share emission
offsets. Let us find the optimal technological mix x∗4—solution to Problem 4. Problem
(29)–(31) is equivalent to the following problem (see (5), (7)):
maximize
x∈X4
(x, δp) = e(x) − δpE(x). (57)
Thus, two alternatives are possible in Case 2.
Case 2a E ≥ E(x∗1 (δp)), meaning that the contracted amount of offsets is larger
than optimal emissions at the CO2 price δp. In this case x∗1 (δp) ∈ X4 (31), and as it
is the solution to (57), we have:
x∗4 (p) = x∗1 (δp). (58)
Hence, according to Assumption 1 for all δ ∈ [0, 1) one has:
E(x∗4 ) = E(x∗1 (δp)) > E(x∗1 (p)). (59)
Substituting ER(p) = E − E(x∗4 ) to (37), leads to:
φ(p) = (1 − δ)pE(x
∗
4 )
E + δp. (60)
Function ξ(p) (35) is calculated as follows:
ξ(p) = δp + e(x
∗
4 ) − E(x∗4 )δp
E −
e(x∗1 (p)) − E(x∗1 (p))p
E . (61)
For the optimal mix x∗4 ∈ X such that (59) is true one can apply Lemma 1:
e(x∗1 (p)) − E(x∗1 (p))p > e(x∗4 ) − E(x∗4 )p. (62)
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Fig. 6 Optimal emissions of the electricity producer with respect to CO2 price (horizontal axis) without
REDD offsets. A conceptual graph of Eˆ(p), satisfying Assumption 1
Substitution of (62) to (61) gives the required inequality:
ξ(p) = δp + e(x
∗
4 ) − E(x∗4 )δp −
(
e(x∗1 (p)) − E(x∗1 (p))p
)
E
< δp + e(x
∗
4 ) − E(x∗4 )δp −
(
e(x∗4 ) − E(x∗4 )p
)
E
= δp + (1 − δ)pE(x
∗
4 )
E = φ(p). (63)
Case 2b E < E(x∗1 (δp)), meaning that the contracted amount is less than optimal
emissions at price δp. In this case x∗1 (δp) /∈ X4 (31). According to Assumption 1
there exist price pˆ, δp < pˆ < p, and technological mix x∗1 ( pˆ) (see Fig. 6), such that:
x∗1 ( pˆ) ∈ X4 : E(x∗1 ( pˆ)) = E . (64)
Below we show that technological mix x∗4 = x∗1 ( pˆ) is the solution to Problem 4 in
this case. Let us take a technological mix x˜4 ∈ X4 (31) different from x∗1 ( pˆ) (64). As
E(x˜4) ≤ E(x∗1 ( pˆ)), the following inequality holds:
E(x∗1 ( pˆ))( pˆ − δp) ≥ E(x˜4)( pˆ − δp). (65)
At the same time, by definition of maximum (8) at the price pˆ we have:
e(x∗1 ( pˆ)) − E(x∗1 ( pˆ)) pˆ ≥ e(x˜4) − E(x˜4) pˆ. (66)
Combining (65) and (66) one gets:
e(x∗1 ( pˆ)) − E(x∗1 ( pˆ)) pˆ + E(x∗1 ( pˆ))( pˆ − δp)
≥ e(x˜4) − E(x˜4) pˆ + E(x˜4)( pˆ − δp), (67)
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that leads to:
e(x∗1 ( pˆ)) − E(x∗1 ( pˆ))δp ≥ e(x˜4) − E(x˜4)δp for all x˜4 ∈ X4, (68)
meaning that ˆR4 = (x∗1 ( pˆ)), δp), and:
E(x∗4 ) = E(x∗1 ( pˆ)) = E > E(x∗1 (p)). (69)
We have proved that in Case 2b the electricity producer does not return any offsets to
the forest owner and uses the whole amount E . Thus, in this case ˆR(p) = ˆR3 = ˆR4
and this situation is the same as in Case 1. Thus, we have proved that in all cases:
ξ(p) < φ(p). (70)
	unionsq
A.4 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof According to Assumption 1 the amount E˜ (43) is emitted by the electricity
producer at any price pl in the distribution (12). Hence, for every p = pl in the
distribution the conditions of Lemma 2 are true, meaning that according to Corollary 1:
φ(p) = ξ(p) = p. (71)
Substituting (71) to definitions of fair prices (36), (38) we get:
pE =
M∑
l=1
ξ(pl)wl =
M∑
l=1
φ(pl)wl =
M∑
l=1
plwl = p¯. (72)
The same reasoning is valid for any E ∈ (0, E˜], and, hence, (42) is true.
For the amount of REDD offsets E ∈ (E˜, E0] for some CO2 price realizations
p = pl in distribution (12) the conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied and, hence,
φ(pl) = ξ(pl). At the same time, there are price realizations in distribution (12),
at which conditions of Lemma 3 are satisfied (at least for the price p˜ = max{pl}),
meaning that φ(pl = p˜) > ξ(pl = p˜), and hence:
M∑
l=1
φ(pl)wl >
M∑
l=1
ξ(pl)wl . (73)
Sustitution of (73) to definitions of fair prices (36), (38) provides the required
inequality:
pF =
M∑
l=1
φ(pl)wl >
M∑
l=1
ξ(pl)wl = pE . (74)
	unionsq
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